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INTRODUCTION 
This Essay disputes the view that a president’s independent authority 
to use non-defensive armed military force short of a “major conflict” is 
merely a political question rather than an issue affirmatively regulated by 
the Constitution, congressional enactments, and established legal 
principles of necessity.1 The Prussian war theorist Carl von Clausewitz 
 
* Associate Professor and Faculty Director, National Security & Civil Rights Program, Loyola 
University Chicago School of Law. The author thanks the symposium participants, Barry Sullivan, 
Alan Raphael, and Alex Tsesis for their comments on earlier drafts. 
1. This essay expands upon my public remarks at the symposium on April 5, 2019. The term 
“military force” refers to armed attacks or hostile territorial invasions by elements of the U.S. armed 
forces acting as such. It thereby excludes other uses of force, whether armed or unarmed, such as 
those engaged in pursuant to congressionally-authorized covert action. See 50 U.S.C. § 3093(e)(2) 
(2019) (expressly excluding “traditional . . . military activities”) and  cyber intrusion operations 
that do not result in more than negligible physical damage to persons or property. 10 U.S.C. § 
394(b) (2018) (authorizing military cyber activities or operations “short of hostilities” as the term 
is used in the War Powers Resolution). “Military force” also excludes consensual military presence 
in a foreign territory for purposes other than using combative force, such as to provide disaster 
recovery aid or assistance. For excellent commentary on the constitutionality of covert action 
statutes, see Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten 
Power, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1035 (1986). 
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wrote that war is the continuation of politics by other means.2 This is 
certainly a fair observation of international relations, in which armed 
force remains a permissible means for achieving various geopolitical 
ends.3 Under the Constitution, however, a decision to use non-defensive 
military force should result from the Constitution’s law-making process,4 
rather than—as is now often the case—begin, truncate, or ignore that 
process. 
This Essay briefly reviews the current situation and comprehensively 
surveys the Constitution’s allocation of war- and military-related powers 
to demonstrate Congress's extensive authority over war and the nation's 
armed forces. This review strongly confirms the view that the 
Constitution requires Congress to affirmatively authorize all non-
defensive military force and provides Congress with several powers to 
check a president's use and command of the military. It then briefly posits 
some of the reasons these constitutional norms have eroded, clarifies why 
aberrant past practice cannot amend the Constitution's separation of war 
powers, and explains why Congress must reestablish its authority, briefly 
suggesting two ways that it may do so. 
I.  THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM 
Since World War II, it has become increasingly common practice for 
presidents to use non-defensive military force abroad without obtaining 
congressional preapproval, thereby leaving Congress with no meaningful 
role in the decision. Recent examples include: the Trump 
Administration’s missile strikes against targets in Syria in response to the 
alleged use of chemical weapons against civilians;5 the Obama 
Administration’s aerial attacks and other actions supporting United 
 
2. See 1 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 23 (The Floating Press trans., The Floating Press 
2010) (1832) (defining war as a “political instrument, a continuation of the same by other means”). 
3. Although the use of armed force as a means of settling disputes in international affairs is now 
tempered by the United Nations Charter, military force is the Security Council’s last resort for 
addressing and resolving threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. See 
U.N. Charter arts. 1–2 (stating the purposes of the United Nations are to maintain peace and to 
harmonize the actions of nations); id. at arts. 39–42 (describing the Security Council’s authority to 
determine the existence of threats to peace and which measures may be undertaken to restore peace, 
including measures involving the use of armed force). 
4. A congressional declaration of war may not properly be termed a “law” but results from the 
same process by which laws are typically adopted. Other congressional enactments authorizing 
armed hostilities also result from this process. See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force, 
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing use of “necessary and appropriate” military 
force in response to the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001). 
5. See April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities, 42 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1–
3 (Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel 2018) [hereinafter Syrian 
Airstrikes Memorandum] (describing strikes and alleged authority to order them). 
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Nations authorized measures to protect civilians in Libya;6 and the 
Clinton Administration’s uses of force against Serbia as part of North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization operations to protect Kosovars, among 
many others.7 Of these three examples, only one was authorized by the 
Security Council of the United Nations (Libya).8 The Security Council is 
the only body empowered by international law to use or authorize non-
defensive force against other nations.9 Additionally, none of these uses 
of military force received prior congressional authorization or formal, 
post hoc congressional condemnation.10 
This modern practice is clearly at odds with the Constitution’s text and 
original meaning. A wealth of scholarly commentary concludes that the 
Constitution grants Congress alone the power to authorize non-defensive 
military force.11 Although not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, 
ample commentary also concludes that a president has inherent 
constitutional power to defend the nation from an actual or impending 
attack.12 
 
6. See Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1–6 (Caroline D. Krass, 
Principle Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel 2011) [hereinafter Military Force 
in Libya Memorandum] (explaining that the Libyan government’s attacks on civilians led to United 
States military involvement in the conflict based upon United Nations authorization President 
Obama’s constitutional authority and discretion). 
7. For a thorough catalog and concise summary of the U.S. uses of military force abroad through 
late 2017, see BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42738, INSTANCES OF 
USE OF ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798–2017 (2017). 
8. S.C. Res. 1973, ¶¶ 2, 4 (Mar. 17, 2011) (authorizing all measures necessary to protect certain 
civilians, but prohibiting an occupation force). 
9. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (preserving nations’ inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense). 
10. See TORREON, supra note 7 at 17, 25-27 (describing the Serbian and Libyan attacks). 
11. See, e.g., DAVID J. BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND 
CONGRESS, 1776 TO ISIS 21–33 (2016) (describing Constitutional Convention debates: “they 
leaned hard in Congress’s favor when making the decision between war and peace” while 
recognizing president “would need power to repel sudden attacks”); JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 3 (1993) 
(asserting that the power to declare war is constitutionally vested in Congress); MICHAEL D. 
RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 218–38 (2007) (arguing that the 
drafters of the Constitution specifically designed the federal government such that executive power 
was not centralized in one branch, giving some power to the Executive Branch but reserving power 
that had traditionally gone to a king within a monarchy system instead to Congress, including the 
power to wage non-defensive war); Saikrishna Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the 
Constitution Means by “Declare War”, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 47 (2007) (asserting Congress’s 
unique power to declare war was developed by the Framers of the Constitution). See also William 
Michael Treanor, Fame, The Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 
696 (1997) (listing numerous other proponents of this view). 
12. See, e.g., BARRON, supra note 11, at 22 (explaining the constitutional convention 
acknowledged the necessity of vesting the power to repel a sudden attack in the executive); ELY, 
supra note 11, at 6 (arguing that because some military emergencies can arise faster than Congress 
can act, the founders intended for the president to be able to act quickly where a clear danger to 
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Nevertheless, some commentators and courts have asserted that a 
modern president’s inherent, independent constitutional power to use 
non-defensive military force is a political rather than a legal question.13 
Put differently, they argue that a president’s constitutional authority to 
invade the rights of other nations and their citizens through non-defensive 
military force—and thereby to risk lives, liberty, and property interests 
of United States citizens—is subject to the whims of the president and 
any political responses by Congress. One commentator recently argued 
that this situation results from the fact that labeling various types of 
military actions, for example, as “offensive” or “defensive,” is difficult 
and the Constitution’s allocation of war powers to the executive and 
legislative branches is ambiguous and uncertain in any given context.14 
Even more troubling, contemporary executive branch legal advisers 
claim that presidents possess inherent and independent constitutional 
authority to use non-defensive military force whenever they can make a 
colorable claim that doing so advances a “national interest” and when the 
“anticipated hostilities” do not constitute a “war in the constitutional 
sense.”15 What is meant by “war in the constitutional sense” is not clear16 
and has changed over time.17 The term is more recently asserted to mean 
 
national security develops unexpectedly and requires immediate military response); RAMSEY, 
supra note 11, at 239–48 (arguing that the founders believed that the president retained some 
powers to use military force as needed); Prakash, supra note 11, at 116–18 (stating that historically, 
the president has had the power to repel “sudden attacks,” such as in the case of thwarting Indian 
raids). 
13. For some such commentary, see, e.g., MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 21–22 (2013) (explaining how the view of presidential power 
regarding military action has changed over time to one of political rather than juridical dimensions); 
see also Treanor, supra note 11, at 696 (listing scholars who believe executive branch possesses 
independent constitutional power to initiate military force or that entire matter is political question). 
For references to judicial decisions, see, e.g., infra Section II.C (stating that Congress holds the 
power for non-defensive war acts).  
14. ZEISBERG, supra note 13, at 20–21. 
15. See, e.g., Syrian Airstrikes Memorandum, supra note 5, at 9–10 (describing “quasi-war,” or 
a situation where limited military engagements are necessary but the concern did not rise to the 
level of a true declaration of war).  
16. See, e.g., id. at 9 n.3 and related text (discussing longstanding executive branch view that 
some military engagements require congressional approval but others, based upon their “scale,” do 
not—but without any attempt to articulate the “scale” of military conflict that is constitutionally 
significant). 
17. For example, the Truman Administration publicly (but never “formally”) claimed that the 
Korean conflict was not a “war” requiring congressional approval because it was a “police action” 
under the authority of the United Nations. See Louis Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis 
Did Truman Act?, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 21, 33–34 (1995) [hereinafter Fisher, Korean War] 
(explaining that the Truman administration crafted a narrative that his actions in declaring military 
action in Korea fell within the presidential military powers but that in reality, Truman preempted 
Congress in his decision making). It would seem that the scale of American involvement in Korea 
constituted a “war” in any logical understanding of the term. According to the Congressional 
2019] War is More Than a Political Question 489 
that the anticipated intensity and scale of non-defensive military 
operations will not result in a major military conflict that should require 
Congress to declare war.18 It is, of course, dubious to claim that a 
president’s prediction about whether a major conflict will result from a 
given military attack determines his or her inherent power to order one. 
This approach fallaciously presumes that the executive branch can 
accurately predict the responses of other nations. 
Executive branch assertions regarding what constitutes a sufficient 
national interest have also been irreconcilably inconsistent. Some include 
claims that a use of non-defensive military force will bolster the 
credibility or authority of the United Nations.19 Other non-defensive uses 
of force have clearly violated the United Nations Charter and the will of 
its Security Council.20 According to the legal memorandum that 
rationalized the Trump Administration missile strikes against Syria after 
the fact, an adequate national interest includes virtually anything a 
president deems to be so.21 
The current reality is that presidents may, in practice, get away with 
using non-defensive military force if Congress ultimately acquiesces in 
their decision to do so—either by expressing no formal opposition at all 
or by providing a president with funding and other support.22 This 
 
Research Service, as of August 29, 2018, an estimated 1,789,000 Americans served in Korea during 
the three-year conflict; 36,574 were killed or died as the result of their service, and 103,284 were 
wounded. LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, RL32492, AMERICAN WAR AND MILITARY 
OPERATIONS CASUALTIES: LISTS AND STATISTICS 2, 8 (2018); id. at 8. 
18. See, e.g., Syrian Airstrikes Memorandum, supra note 5, at 18–22 (conducting “fact-specific 
assessment of the anticipated nature, scope and duration of the planned military operations,” 
including “whether U.S. forces were likely to encounter signification armed resistance . . . [or] 
suffer or inflict substantial casualties”). 
19. See, e.g., Fisher, Korean War, supra note 17, at 33 (discussing Truman administration 
arguments that intervention in Korea was essential to upholding the United Nations Charter and the 
“rule of law,” but noting that Truman admitted he would have acted without U.N. approval if 
needed). 
20. The Trump Administration strikes against Syria were not approved by the Security Council 
of the United Nations. See, e.g., Caitlin A. Buckley, Learning from Libya, Acting in Syria, 5 J. 
STRATEGIC SEC. 81, 88–89 (2012) (discussing international opposition to intervention in Syria, 
including Russian refusal to allow Security Council action similar to that pertaining to Libya). The 
legal memorandum rationalizing the strikes in Syria did not even attempt to reconcile them with 
the United Nations Charter or other international law. See generally Syrian Airstrikes 
Memorandum, supra note 5. 
21. See Syrian Airstrikes Memorandum, supra note 5, at 10 (“The scope of U.S. involvement 
in the world, the presence of U.S. citizens across the globe, and U.S. leadership in times of conflict, 
crisis, and strife require that the President have wide latitude to protect American interests by 
responding to regional conflagrations and humanitarian catastrophes as he believes appropriate. . . . 
We would not expect that any President would use this power without a substantial basis for 
believing that a proposed operation is necessary to advance important interests of the Nation.”). 
22. Although Congress never clearly authorized hostilities in Korea, it took several actions to 
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politically-motivated convention,23 or practice, among our co-equal 
branches of government is not the original constitutional design.24 As the 
Supreme Court has said in another context, “the presence of 
constitutional issues with significant political overtones does not 
automatically [create a nonjusticiable] political question. . . .”25 
This Essay rejects the notion that a president’s independent 
constitutional authority to use non-defensive military force is, as a matter 
of constitutional law, left solely to the routine political give and take of 
the elected branches. In a republic based upon fundamental individual 
rights to life, liberty, and property—and of a limited central government 
constrained by fundamental law—legislative acts and well-accepted 
principles of necessity must govern a president’s legal authority to invade 
individual rights by a use of military force. A more complete contextual 
and structural reading of the Constitution’s text, as well as early 
government practice and relevant Supreme Court precedent, demonstrate 
that the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution believed these basic, 
rule-of-law and separation-of-powers principles to be thoroughly etched 
into the Constitution’s original design. 
II.  CONGRESSIONAL PRIMACY OVER MILITARY FORCE AND THE ARMED 
FORCES 
A careful review of the Constitution’s text reveals that it vests 
Congress, not the president, with sole control over decisions to use non-
defensive military force and with a large measure of superior authority 
over the nation’s armed forces. Furthermore, early presidents believed, 
and pre-World War II Supreme Court precedent established, that only 
express or implied congressional authorization or an imperative necessity 
to defend the nation, including its territories instrumentalities, and 
 
support them, including extending the draft, see Selective Service Extension Act of 1950, Pub. L. 
No. 81-599, 64 Stat. 318 (codified June 30, 1950) (stating that the draft extends to every male 
citizen “now or hereafter in the United States”); 1951 Amendments to the Universal Military 
Training and Service Act, Pub. L. No. 82-51, 65 Stat. 75 (codified June 19, 1951) (broadly stating 
that the draft applies to all male citizens from ages eighteen to twenty-six, and that male citizens 
must register and appear for the draft when military action is declared). 
23. For a definition and an analysis of “constitutional conventions”, see generally Keith E. 
Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States, 2013 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1847 (2013). 
24. But see STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 48 (2013) (asserting 
that “beginning with [the] Korea[n conflict] an amendment-level constitutional change” established 
by the practice of the elected branches now grants the president broad, independent authority to 
take the nation to war). I address this claim in Part IV, infra. 
25. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942–43 (1983) (explaining the political question doctrine in 
the context of Congressional action on deportation versus Executive authority on the matter). 
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perhaps its citizens, permits the unilateral use of military force by the 
executive branch.26 
A.  Congressional Powers 
Article I, Section 8 contains most of the affirmative grants of 
congressional power. There are eighteen clauses, some containing 
multiple powers.27 Commentary discussing a president’s independent 
power to use military force typically focuses on the scope and substance 
of Congress’s power to “declare war.”28 While that analysis is necessary 
and appropriate, it can be misleading if it ignores the larger context in 
which the power to declare war is constitutionally situated. To understand 
Congress’s constitutional primacy over the nation’s military and its use, 
a more comprehensive analysis of congressional powers is essential. 
Congressional powers over the military, its use, and related matters are 
numerous and substantial. Seven of the eighteen clauses in Article I, 
Section 8 explicitly give Congress control over the existence, 
composition, organization, training, and discipline of the armed forces, 
including state militias, as well as the funding of military operations, the 
control of military installations, and the use of military force.29 Other 
clauses give Congress integral or closely-related powers. Section 10 of 
Article I strengthens congressional control by denying similar powers to 
the states without congressional approval.30 An analysis of these powers 
places the power to declare war in a broader context. 
In addition to the power “to declare war,” Article I, Section 8 grants 
Congress the following powers, some of which are paraphrased for clarity 
and brevity. 
 
26. The precise nature of this defensive power is currently unclear. Executive branch practice 
has evolved over time. I intend to more thoroughly examine the scope of the presidency’s defensive 
power in future work. 
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power to “declare War, grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,” among other 
powers). 
28. See generally RAMSEY, supra note 11, at 218–48; Prakash, supra note 11;. See also John C. 
Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 
84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 242–250 (1996) (arguing that in splitting the power to declare war and fund 
war between the executive and legislative branches, the framers of the Constitution actually 
intended to adopt the traditional monarchical system whereby the executive declares war, except 
for “formal” declarations, and the legislature dictates spending; the framers intended the executive 
branch to have the power to initiate war and provide an opportunity for the legislature to review 
such decisions during the appropriations process). 
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–17. 
30. Id. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, 
keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another 
State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent 
Danger as will not admit of delay.”). 
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Clause 11 empowers Congress to “grant letters of Marque and 
Reprisal, and make rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”31 The 
power to declare war, coupled with these powers, gives Congress sole 
authority to authorize all non-defensive uses of military force as 
understood in the founding era.32 That Congress possesses power to grant 
letters of marque and reprisal—by which it may commission private 
individuals to engage in limited punitive, retaliatory, or other military 
measures—strongly implies that the president does not possess 
independent constitutional power to engage in even minor uses of force.33 
While the nature and scope of these powers is debated, early justices of 
the Supreme Court found that limited uses of military force were “public 
war” that only Congress could authorize and may also, therefore, 
constrain.34 Early presidential and congressional practice also provides 
persuasive evidence that the Framers believed only Congress possesses 
the constitutional power to authorize the use of non-defensive military 
force.35 
 
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
32. Prakash, supra note 11, at 49–50 (“In the context of the Constitution, the grant of ‘declare 
war’ power means that only Congress can decide whether the United States will wage war.”); see 
also BARRON, supra note 11, at 22 (noting the draft Constitution “expressly provided that Congress 
could declare war” and “even granted Congress the power issue letters of marque and reprisal, 
[which] allowed only a very limited use of military power”); RAMSEY, supra note 11, at 218–38 
(describing these clauses as “efforts to shift decisionmaking about offensive war from the executive 
magistrate . . . to Congress” and stating “the narrow meaning of the declare war clause also fits 
poorly with the marque-and-reprisal clause”). 
33. Prakash, supra note 11, at 55; Jules Lobel, “Little Wars” and the Constitution, 50 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 61, 70 (1995) (“The Marque and Reprisal Clause was inserted in Article I to ensure that 
lesser forms of hostilities came within congressional power. . . . At minimum, the clause supports 
a broad interpretation of the Declare War Clause to include all acts of warfare initiated against other 
nations.”). 
34. See, e.g., Bas. v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 40 (1800) (opinion of Washington, J.) (“[E]very 
contention by force between two nations in external matters, under the authority of their respective 
governments, is not only war, but public war.”). 
[H]ostilities may subsist between two nations more confined in its nature and extent, 
being limited as to places, persons, and things, and this is more properly termed imperfect 
war; because not solemn, and because those who are authorized to commit hostilities, 
act under special authority, and can go no further than to the extent of their commission. 
Still, however, it is public war, because it is an external contention by force between 
some of the members of the two nations . . . . 
Id. at 40; see also id. at 43 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“Congress has not declared war in general terms; 
but Congress has authorized hostilities on the high seas by certain persons in certain cases. . . . So 
far it is, unquestionably, a partial war; but, nevertheless, it is a public war . . . .”); id. at. 46 (opinion 
of Patterson, J.) (finding limited naval conflict to be “a public war between the two nations, 
qualified, on our part, in the manner prescribed by the constitutional organ of our country”). 
35. See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 11, at 96–107 (recounting significant early presidential and 
congressional practice).  
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Clause 12 grants Congress the power “[t]o raise and support Armies, 
but no Appropriation” may exceed two years.36 Related to this power and 
its two-year limitation, it is no accident: (1) that the House of 
Representatives—originally the only representatives directly elected by 
the people37—is elected every two years;38 (2) that no money may be 
drawn from the treasury except pursuant to appropriations made by law;39 
and (3) that all bills raising revenue must originate in the House of 
Representatives.40 Raising and maintaining an army requires funding. If 
a standing army—an institution thought abhorrent to many in the 
Founding Era, especially if maintained in times of peace41—were to be 
improperly used for domestic matters, or to fight unnecessary foreign 
wars, the Constitution ensures that the people can elect new 
representatives with a mandate to stop funding it.42 
Clause 13 confers upon Congress the power “[t]o provide and maintain 
a Navy.”43 With such a large coast and many navigable waterways, a 
navy was a necessary and uncontroversial first line of defense for the 
fledgling nation.44 Although Congress had the raw ability not to exercise 
this power, America needed a navy to protect both its territory and its 
 
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress the power to raise armies). 
37. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. Originally, Senators were to be chosen by the state legislatures, id. art. 
I, § 3, cl. 1. This was changed by the Seventeenth Amendment, proposed May 13, 1912 and declared 
by the Secretary of State to have been ratified by thirty-six states on May 31, 1913 pursuant to id. 
art I, § 3, cl. 1. 
38. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
39. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
40. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
41. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton) (recounting the dangers of standing 
armies). 
42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 42 (Alexander Hamilton) (vol. 2, J. and A. McLean, 1788) 
(“Next to the effectual establishment of the Union, the best possible precaution against danger from 
standing armies is a limitation of the term for which revenue may be appropriated to their 
support.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 175 (Alexander Hamilton) (vol. 1, J. and A. 
McLean 1788) (“Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a full answer to those 
who require a more peremptory provision against military establishments in time of peace, to say 
that the whole power of the proposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the 
people. This is the essential, and, after all, only efficacious security for the rights and privileges of 
the people, which is attainable in civil society.”). For a more robust analysis on the constitutional 
implications of the budget power in this context, see Lucas Issacharroff & Samuel Issacharroff, 
Constitutional Implications of the Cost of War, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 169 (2016). Of course, the 
current geopolitical environment makes it highly unlikely that the body politic will elect a Congress 
with a mandate to defund the U.S. military establishment. 
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13. 
44. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 42, at 44 (“The palpable necessity of the power to 
provide and maintain a navy has protected that part of the Constitution against a spirit of censure, 
which has spared few other parts. It must, indeed, be numbered among the greatest blessings of 
America, that as her Union will be the only source of her maritime strength, so this will be a 
principal source of her security against danger from abroad.”). 
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foreign commerce.45 In 1794, Congress obliged by authorizing the 
president to acquire, equip, and employ six ships with specific 
armaments.46 Congress also prescribed not only the exact crew 
membership but also their pay and rations,47 demonstrating the 
comprehensive control that Congress may exercise over the existence, 
composition, and administrative operation of the armed forces should it 
choose to do so. 
Under clause 14, Congress is given the power to “make rules for the 
government and regulation of the land and naval forces.”48 Not only may 
Congress decide whether to have armed forces, exactly how many, and 
exactly how they will be paid, equipped and supplied, it also has 
express—according to the Supreme Court “plenary”—authority to 
regulate the conduct of the armed forces once created.49 Executive branch 
legal advisors have sometimes claimed that presidents possess the 
constitutional power to violate international and some domestic laws 
regulating war.50 However, the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) enacted by Congress requires members of the armed forces to 
comply with these laws and subjects them to criminal prosecution for 
unauthorized acts of violence in war.51 The Supreme Court has 
consistently required the president and executive branch to comply with 
applicable provisions of the UCMJ, including those that incorporate 
 
45. Id. 
46. Act to Provide a Naval Armament, sess. 1, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 350 (Mar. 27, 1794). 
47. Id. at 350–51. Interestingly, in the alternative, the Act authorized and empowered the 
president to acquire, “by purchase or otherwise,” a similar naval force not exceeding that provided 
for in the Act. Id. 
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
49. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 
296, 301 (1983)) (“[T]he Constitution contemplates that Congress has ‘plenary control over rights, 
duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establishment, including regulations, 
procedures, and remedies related to military discipline.’”); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 
514 (1879) (noting that Congress’s “control over the whole subject of the formation, organization, 
and government of the national armies, including therein the punishment of offenses committed by 
persons in the military service, would seem to be plenary”); see also Solorio v. United States, 483 
U.S. 435, 446 (1987) (“The unqualified language of Clause 14 suggests that whatever these 
concerns, they were met by vesting in Congress, rather than the Executive, authority to make rules 
for the government of the military.”). 
50. U.S. DEP’T DEF., WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATION IN THE 
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL 
CONCERNS 24 (2003) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Def. Working Group Report], 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/OathBetrayed/Rumsfeld%204-4-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQY7-GGLM] 
(claiming the president has complete discretion in conduct of hostilities not subject to international 
law or even congressional regulation). 
51. See generally John C. Dehn, Why a President Cannot Authorize the Military to Violate 
(Most of) the Law of War, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 813 (2018). 
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international laws regulating war by reference.52 Indeed, a 
comprehensive study concluded that the Court “has never held that any 
statutory limitations on substantive executive war powers have 
unconstitutionally infringed upon the core prerogatives of the 
commander-in-chief.”53 
Clause 15 empowers Congress “[t]o provide for calling forth the 
militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel 
invasions.”54 Although not often cited as such, this congressional 
power—coupled with the power to provide and maintain a navy, the 
president’s constitutional designation as commander in chief, and the 
president’s oath55—are the strongest textual evidence of the president’s 
independent constitutional power and obligation to defend the nation.56 
With no plans for a standing army, a president would first need a navy 
and then, potentially, access to land forces to resist any foreign invasion 
until Congress could convene to more comprehensively address the 
situation.57 Congress’s power to provide for calling forth the militia 
implicitly recognizes that the executive branch inherently possesses this 
defensive responsibility, but empowers Congress to place controls upon 
a president’s access to and use of the personnel necessary to exercise it.58 
Current statutes grant the executive branch broad discretion to use the 
state militias (the organized elements of which are now called the national 
 
52. See, e.g. Hamdan v. Rumsfled, 554 U.S. 557, 628 (2006) (concluding “compliance with the 
law of war is the condition upon which the authority of Article 21 [of the UCMJ, which preserves 
authority to use military commissions,] is granted”). 
53. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—a 
Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1106 (2008). 
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
55. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (emphasis added) (“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully 
execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”). 
56. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1862) (“If a war be made by invasion of a foreign 
nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate 
the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority.”). 
57. Note that the Constitution requires Congress to convene only once per year. U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 4, cl. 2. 
58. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, at 178 (Alexander Hamilton) (vol. 1, J. and A. McLean 1788) 
(“The power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and 
invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching 
over the internal peace of the Confederacy.”). An excellent student Note traces how and why 
Congress initially placed more stringent conditions on calling forth the militia, particularly for 
domestic emergencies, but relaxed them over time. See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, 
Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149 (2004). 
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guard)59 and federal armed forces for various international and domestic 
emergencies and other matters.60 
Clause 16 gives Congress the power to, “[p]rovide for organizing, 
arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them 
as may be employed in the service of the United States . . . .”61 Similar to 
the armed forces of the United States, Congress controls not only the 
ability to levy and federalize the state militias, but also to regulate them 
once federalized and to dictate their organization and training by the 
states.62 
Article I, Section 8 adds several related powers, including the powers 
to tax and to “provide for the common defense,”63 “to define and punish 
piracies . . . and [other] offences against the law of nations,”64 “to 
exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over . . . all places 
purchased . . . for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, 
and other needful buildings,”65 and to enact any legislation needed to 
fully exercise these powers, in the form of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.66 
In total, then, more than half of Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers 
directly relate to its authority to create the armed forces and to regulate 
their use. Every use of military force, even defensive force, requires 
 
59. 10 U.S.C. § 246(b) (2019). 
60. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 12301–12304(b) (2019) (providing for calling up reserve components, 
including national guard units, for various international and domestic purposes); see also 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 252–253 (2019) (providing president with discretion to determine when the active or reserve 
military is needed to execute domestic laws, to determine how many troops are required, and to 
“take such measures he considers necessary”). 
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
62. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (emphasis added) (“[R]eserving to the States respectively, the 
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline 
prescribed by Congress . . . .”). 
63. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
64. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
65. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
66. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. If there is any question how much work the Necessary and Proper 
Clause does in this context, note that it has resulted in the creation of a Coast Guard, an Air Force 
and, perhaps soon, a Space Force. 
[The Department of Defense] recently developed a series of additional proposals that 
would authorize the creation of an 11th unified combatant command responsible for 
space. Separately, the Trump Administration called for Congress to establish by 2020 a 
new military service branch—Space Force—with the goal of asserting “American 
dominance in space.” The new service branch would be the first since the creation of the 
U.S. Air Force (previously part of the Army) in 1947. 
STEVEN A. HILDRETH ET AL., Cong. RESEARCH SERV., IF10950, TOWARD THE CREATION OF A 
U.S. “SPACE FORCE” (2018). President Trump directed the creation of a space-focused combatant 
command on December 18, 2018. See Establishment of United States Space Command as a Unified 
Combatant Command, 83 Fed. Reg. 65483 (Dec. 18, 2018). 
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several acts of legislation. These include acts not only creating and 
equipping the armed forces, but also authorizing, funding and regulating 
their training and actual operation, whether in domestic or foreign 
affairs.67 All of this undermines the common executive branch claim that 
a president has substantial autonomous discretion to “direct the military” 
or to use military force short of major war in any way he or she sees fit.68 
Other elements of the United States Constitution strengthen 
congressional control over the nation’s armed forces and their use by 
denying similar powers to the several states. Article I, Section 10 forbids 
states from maintaining troops or ships of war in times of peace without 
the consent of Congress,69 and prohibits states from granting letters of 
marque and reprisal.70 It also prohibits states from engaging in war 
“unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of 
delay.”71 These clauses further clarify that absent a need to defend the 
nation from an actual or imminent attack, Congress alone controls the 
existence and use of the nation’s armed forces.72 
These complementary congressional powers are likely why the 
Supreme Court declared in 1801 that “the whole powers of war” are 
constitutionally vested in Congress rather than the president.73 This 
phrasing potentially encompasses not only Congress’s sole power to 
authorize non-defensive uses of military force, including their scope and 
related matters (such as compensation for prize captures), but also the 
power to create, regulate, and put conditions upon the access to and use 
of the national armed forces for any legitimate purpose. 
B.  Presidential Military and War Powers 
Although an exegesis of presidential powers is beyond the scope of 
this Essay, a few key points are essential. The presidency is vested with 
“the executive power.”74 Some commentators argue this grant includes 
 
67. Congress generally adjusts the manpower and funds equipment acquisition, maintenance 
and military operations in annual legislation. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283 (Dec. 12, 2017) (authorizing appropriations 
for military activities, construction, and defense activities for 2018). 
68. This alleged presidential power was highly leveraged in the legal rationalization for the 
missile strikes on Syria. See Syrian Airstrikes Memorandum, supra note 5, at 4–6 (discussing the 
president’s powers as Commander in Chief). 
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
70. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
71. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
72. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing importance of national 
legislative control over the military to preservation of individual rights). 
73. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1801). 
74. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
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broad power to conduct the nation’s foreign affairs, qualified only by 
express grants of foreign affairs powers to Congress, while others posit 
that the Constitution confers no comprehensive foreign affairs powers 
upon the presidency.75 The president is also denominated “Commander 
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of 
the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United 
States.”76 Whatever the scope of these presidential powers, nothing in the 
structure or text of the Constitution suggests that they in any way 
diminish Congress’s express or implied powers over the military, or its 
singular constitutional authority over non-defensive use of military 
force.77 
Indeed, The Federalist strongly suggests that the Constitution 
subordinates the presidency to Congress in almost all matters involving 
the armed forces, except for commanding them in battle, including the 
authority to initiate a non-defensive use of military force. For example, 
several of Hamilton’s essays refer to the office of the presidency as only 
a “chief magistrate,” with one stating that a president possesses authority 
“in few instances greater, in some instances less, than those of a governor 
of New York.”78 
 
75. See, e.g., H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: 
AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 8–19 (2002) (surveying views of foreign affairs 
scholars). 
76. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
77. Note here that the Necessary and Proper Clause suggests exactly the opposite conclusion, 
in that Congress is expressly granted the power not only “[t]o make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers” but also, “[a]ll other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department 
or Officer thereof.” Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. In his essays in The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton 
refers to the president and vice president as the “executive department.” See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 
67, 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (indicating that all powers granted to the president are subject to 
regulation by Congress). See also John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 
128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 46 (2014) (asserting that the latter section of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
“gives Congress express authority over the implementation of the coordinate branches’ powers. 
Hence, the notion that the president is the sole repository of the executive power does not resolve 
to what degree, and by what means, Congress may regulate the exercise of such presidential 
power.”). As Justice Jackson said in his concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, “[p]residential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or 
conjunction with those of Congress.” 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952). 
78. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 77. The use of the term magistrate here is no accident. 
Hamilton refers to the presidency as a “magistrate” or “chief magistrate” multiple times, including 
in The Federalist No. 67, The Federalist No. 68, The Federalist No. 69, The Federalist No. 71, The 
Federalist No. 72, The Federalist No. 73, The Federalist No. 74. and in several other places, in 
each case distinguishing it from a monarch or hereditary chief magistrate. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 
67–68, 71–74 (Alexander Hamilton). The term “magistrate” in relation to the presidency has 
particular import for the use of military force that I will examine in more detail in future work. 
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Regarding the commander in chief power, Hamilton clarified that a 
president’s “authority would be nominally the same with that of the king 
of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it.”79 He described it 
as “nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military 
and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy.”80 
Hamilton further explained that the powers of “the British king extends 
to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and 
armies, all which, by the Constitution under consideration [are granted] 
to the legislature.”81 Hamilton thus clearly viewed the president’s power 
as “commander in chief” to include only the authority to lead the military 
in the pursuit of national objectives established by Congress rather than 
independent authority to establish such objectives.82 
It is true that Hamilton extolled the virtues of an energetic, independent 
and unitary executive.83 To assuage concerns about creating an executive 
with too much power, however, he clarified that the president would 
remain “subordinate to the laws of the legislature” although not “fully 
dependent upon the legislature.”84 He buttressed this with a rhetorical 
question: “what would be to be feared from an elective magistrate of four 
years duration with the confined authorities of a president of the United 
States?”85 Thus, while Hamilton observed that “in the conduct of war 
. . .  the energy of the executive is the bulwark of the national security,” 
he nowhere suggested that the president would have independent 
constitutional authority to initiate a war or any other non-defensive use 
of military force, or to violate any related domestic legislation limiting 
that force. In fact, Hamilton several times expressly rejected any such 
notion. 
The Federalist also explains why both the executive branch and the 
states are, and must be, subordinate to Congress when it comes to using 
non-defensive military force. In The Federalist No. 3, John Jay clarified 
that the national government must possess the foreign affairs and war 
powers to prevent self-interested states from giving other nations just 
 
79. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (vol. 2, J. and A. McLean 1788). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 234 (emphasis added) (“The [president] would have a right to command the military 
and naval forces of the nation; the [king of Great Britain], in addition to this right, possesses that 
of declaring war, and of raising and regulating fleets and armies by his own authority.”). Hamilton 
later refers to the president’s power as the “direction of war” rather than its initiation. THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton). 
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 77. 
84. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton). 
85. Id. 
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cause for war when not in the national interest.86 Later, Jay also explained 
why Congress, rather than the president, must possess sovereign powers 
related to the use of military force. He observed: 
[A]bsolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get 
nothing by it, but for the purposes and objects merely personal, such as 
thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or 
private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or 
partisans. These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the 
mind of the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified 
by justice or the voice and interests of his people.87 
Jay then explained how the Constitution prevented this situation. He 
acknowledged that “inducements to war” then existed and will often 
arise, and that they can be manipulated to justify military action.88 It is 
therefore essential, Jay argued, that one national government possess the 
power to decide when to use military force: 
One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and 
experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may 
be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, 
assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the 
benefit of its foresight and precautions to each.89 
Most tellingly, Jay referred to the national government making these 
decisions as a collective entity rather than an individual:  
[N]ot only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national 
government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and 
settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that 
respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act 
advisedly . . . .90 
Jay thereby clearly distinguished the careful conduct expected of a 
pluralistic government from the unpredictable conduct expected of a 
chief executive with untrammeled discretion to use military force. He 
thereby strongly indicates that the “government” deciding these 
important issues under the Constitution would include Congress, not 
merely the president. 
Jay further explained that a single national government would place 
the militias under a unified command to be used for the benefit of the 
whole union: 
 
86. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay). 
87. THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, at 16–17 (John Jay) (vol. 1, J. and A. McLean 1788). 
88. Id. at 18 (“[W]henever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for operation, 
pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting.”). 
89. Id. 
90. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, supra note 86, at 15 (vol. 1, J. and A. McLean 1788). 
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It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any 
particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State 
governments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of 
concert and unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of 
discipline, and, by putting their officers in a proper line of subordination 
to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, 
and thereby render them more efficient than if divided . . . .91 
Jay continued, “[a]s to those just causes of war which proceed from 
direct and unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good 
national government affords vastly more security against dangers of that 
sort than can be derived from any other quarter.”92 
At this point it is important to recall that the Constitution grants 
Congress the power to establish the national system for organizing, 
training, regulating and calling forth the state militias.93 The president is 
given only the power to command them “when called into actual service” 
pursuant to the system enacted by Congress.94 This arrangement 
reinforces the view that the commander in chief power refers only to a 
centralized commander that executes national policies established and 
limited by Congress.95 It does not grant the president autonomous 
constitutional authority to use or to direct the military in any way he or 
she desires in either domestic governance or foreign affairs. 
The Federalist also clarifies why the Constitution does not grant the 
president entirely independent power to conduct the nation’s foreign 
affairs generally. Some essays focus on the need for a unified 
confederation to protect against foreign influence and interference with 
domestic tranquility.96 In his essays on the executive department, 
however, Hamilton attempted to allay concerns about the potential power 
of the presidency by explaining that Congress may constrain or check the 
 
91. THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, supra note 87, at 18–19. 
92. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, supra note 86, at 14. 
93. See supra Section I.A (describing Congressional powers over the military and their 
enumeration in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution). 
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 79, at 233–34 (“The 
President will have only the occasional command of such part of the militia of the nation as by 
legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the Union.”). 
95. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, supra note 82, at 269 (“Of all the cares or concerns of government, 
the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of 
power by a single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength; and the 
power of directing and employing the common strength, forms a usual and essential part in the 
definition of the executive authority.”). 
96. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 2–5 (John Jay) (discussing the necessity of acting as a 
unified nation to preserve the peace and tranquility of the nation from the interference and influence 
of foreign nations). 
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exercise of almost all of the presidency’s powers, especially those related 
to foreign affairs.97 
Specifically related to foreign influence and executive power, 
Hamilton noted the threat of “cabal, intrigue and corruption . . . chiefly 
from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our 
councils . . . by raising a creature of their own to the chief magistracy of 
the Union.”98 He then explained why it would be “utterly unsafe and 
improper to” entrust the treaty making power solely to “an elective 
magistrate of four years duration.”99 
[A] man raised from the station of a private citizen to the rank of chief 
magistrate, possessed of a moderate or slender fortune, and looking 
forward to a period not very remote when he may probably be obliged 
to return to the station from which he was taken, might sometimes be 
under temptations to sacrifice his duty to his interest, which it would 
require superlative virtue to withstand. An avaricious man might be 
tempted to betray the interests of the state to the acquisition of wealth. 
An ambitious man might make his own aggrandizement, by the aid of 
a foreign power, the price of his treachery to his constituents. The 
history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of 
human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests 
of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its 
intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate 
 
97. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 67 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the limited power of 
the President to appoint temporary Senate seats in Legislative recess). 
98. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (vol. 2, J. and A. McLean 1788). He argued 
that the electoral college and other requirements created by the Constitutional Convention regarding 
those eligible to hold the presidency were essential to prevent such foreign influence. 
But the convention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most provident 
and judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the President to depend 
on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute 
their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people 
of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of 
making the appointment. And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust, all those 
who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. 
Id. at 228. Relatedly, Hamilton thought a president’s eligibility for reelection would encourage him 
or her to act in the national rather than personal interest, the latter of which might result from having 
a predetermined, constitutionally-limited time in office. 
An avaricious man, who might happen to fill the office, looking forward to a time when 
he must at all events yield up the emoluments he enjoyed, would feel a propensity, not 
easy to be resisted by such a man, to make the best use of the opportunity he enjoyed 
while it lasted, and might not scruple to have recourse to the most corrupt expedients to 
make the harvest as abundant as it was transitory; though the same man, probably, with 
a different prospect before him, might content himself with the regular perquisites of his 
situation, and might even be unwilling to risk the consequences of an abuse of his 
opportunities. His avarice might be a guard upon his avarice. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 257–58 (Alexander Hamilton) (vol. 2, J. and A. McLean 1788). 
99. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 273–74 (Alexander Hamilton) (vol. 2, J. and A. McLean 1788). 
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created and circumstanced as would be a President of the United 
States.100 
If these concerns surround the treaty making power, they are 
undoubtedly amplified when it comes to the delicate and potentially 
momentous decisions to use non-defensive military force, just as Jay 
suggested.101 
In sum, The Federalist points decidedly toward the conclusion that 
Congress, not the presidency, possesses sole constitutional power to 
authorize all non-defensive uses of military force, and plays an important 
role constraining the presidency’s command of the military and its 
conduct of foreign affairs matters more generally. They also indicate that 
Congress has substantial authority to regulate even defensive military 
force, including the access to, and the organization and regulation of, the 
military forces necessary to exercise it. 
C.  Judicial Precedent 
The broadly-held original understanding that Congress possesses sole 
constitutional power over non-defensive uses of military force explains 
why pre-World War II Supreme Court precedent consistently held that 
only express or implied congressional authorization, or an imperative 
defensive or protective necessity, justifies an invasion or deprivation of 
the rights of United States citizens or of foreign nationals by military 
force. For example, naval commanders who captured foreign-flagged 
vessels that were beyond the scope of congressionally-authorized 
hostilities were held liable for trespass,102 even if their actions were 
consistent with executive branch orders or guidance.103 During the 
Mexican-American War, an Army commander who seized the private 
property of a United States citizen without adequate proof of an 
imperative necessity to do so was personally responsible for damages.104 
Similarly, a Civil War commander who ordered the criminal prosecution 
of a United States citizen by military tribunal when the civil courts were 
open was required to pay nominal damages.105 
 
100. Id. at 274. 
101. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, supra note 87 (describing the need to use force in a uniform 
manner to protect against foreign interference and influence). 
102. Little v. Berreme, 6 U.S. 170, 177–79 (1804); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 
6 U.S. 64, 122–26 (1804). 
103. See, e.g., Little, 6 U.S. at 178–79 (discussing how the law “shall be carried into effect” 
against naval commanders even though the president had ordered naval captains to seize vessels 
engaged in illicit commerce). 
104. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115, 137 (1851). 
105. Milligan v. Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 380 (C.C.D. Ind. 1871). However, the trial by military 
tribunal was found unconstitutional in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 128–29 (1866). 
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Many other Supreme Court decisions confirm the view that only 
express or clearly implied congressional authorization, or an imperative 
defensive necessity, is needed to justify an abrogation of life, liberty or 
property rights by military force.106 Put differently, a president or 
subordinate commander’s domestic legal authority to invade individual 
rights by a use of military force is governed by congressional enactments 
and well-established doctrines of necessity rather than the uncertainties 
of domestic political posturing or the whims of the executive branch.107 
III.  HOW CONGRESS AND THE PEOPLE LOST CONTROL 
In light of the Constitution’s text and structure, as well as its well-
documented original understanding, it is both surprising and alarming 
that the modern presidency has accrued so much practical (if not legal) 
power in this area. A variety of factors have contributed to this situation. 
Most significantly, Congress has relinquished several of its relevant 
powers—often appropriately—without jealously guarding its remaining 
powers, in particular, its plenary powers to limit funding for military 
operations and to authorize the use of non-defensive military force. This 
Part briefly surveys significant developments that appear to have 
emboldened presidents to use non-defensive force unilaterally. 
First, since World War II, geopolitical realities have changed rather 
drastically. Due to the nature and global distribution of military power—
including intercontinental nuclear weapons—as well as the globalized 
 
106. For a more complete collection and categorization of relevant precedent, including the 
relevant doctrines of necessity expressly and implicitly recognized in it, see generally John C. 
Dehn, The Commander-in-Chief and the Necessities of War: A Conceptual Framework, 83 TEMPLE 
L. REV. 599, 616–48 (2011) [hereinafter Dehn, Necessities]; see also John C. Dehn, Customary 
International Law, the Separation of Powers, and the Choice of Law in Armed Conflict, 102 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2134–152 (2016) [hereinafter Dehn, Choice of Law]. 
107. Dehn, Necessities, supra note 106, at 616–48. Situations of extreme emergency may be 
one area in which politics may supersede law. In theory, such situations allow a president to violate 
the law so long as he informs Congress and they ratify his behavior. The problem is that, in practice, 
presidents are often immune from civil suit for their official military actions, see, e.g., Durand v. 
Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186) (dismissing claim for property damage in 
Nicaraguan town caused by naval bombardment independently ordered by the president), and 
Congress does not take formal action to check the president. This extreme emergency power may 
in fact be more properly considered a political rather than a legal power, in that Congress may ratify 
whatever it wishes and the compelling government interests at stake would likely result in judicial 
deference, as occurred in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944). For a 
discussion, see Dehn, Necessities, supra note 106, at 651–61. In my view, it is a mistake to translate 
this theoretical, extreme emergency power to any use of military force that does not implicate the 
most significant security interests of the United States. Proponents of the “political question” view 
of war powers see things differently. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 
B.U. L. REV. 19, 23 (1970) (“[T]he existence of an emergency is largely a political not a judicial 
question. If the president abuses his power, the only recourse is subsequent congressional action 
and, ultimately, the displeasure of the electorate.”). 
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economy and other factors, America now defines its strategic interests 
quite broadly.108 At least annually, Congress funds and equips a large, 
complex and well-trained military force to protect those interests.109 As 
the Framers feared, however, presidents with readily available armed 
forces are often tempted to use them in ways that do not clearly benefit 
the nation’s long-term interests.110 
Second, Congress has not only raised, equipped and maintained a large 
and permanent national armed force, it has also provided said force with 
significant funding to conduct global operations. This includes naval 
vessels conducting maritime patrols far from United States shores.111 It 
also includes substantial numbers of troops semi-permanently stationed 
in other countries.112 As the commander in chief and chief diplomat with 
 
108. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump, The National Security Strategy for the United States of 
America, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf [https://perma.cc/28KS-NNR5] (describing America’s 
strategic vision as “protecting the American people and preserving our way of life, promoting our 
prosperity, preserving peace through strength, and advancing American influence in the world”); 
Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 2015) [hereinafter Obama NSS], 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.
pdf [https://perma.cc/FCK9-H96R] (characterizing America’s strategic agenda as “ambitious”); 
George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy for the United States of America, WHITE HOUSE 
(Mar. 2006), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ [https://perma.cc/29XC-
YE3N] (stating America’s strategy as “to protect the security of the American people”); see also 
RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, R43838, A SHIFT IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE—ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2 
(2018) (discussing the shift towards “grand strategy” of the US defense budgets, plans, and 
programs). 
109. See NESE F. DEBRUYNE & BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, 
R98756, DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATIONS BILLS: FY1961–FY2019, at 1 (2018) 
(“Congress oversees the defense budget primarily through two yearly bills: the defense 
authorization and defense appropriations bills.”). 
110. See James Madison, Letters of Helvidius No. 4 (Sept. 14 1793) available at 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-15-02-0070 [https://perma.cc/F4P5-NK27] 
(“It is in war . . . that laurels are to be gathered, and it is the executive brow they are to encircle. 
The strongest passions, and most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast; . . . the honorable or 
venial love of fame, are all in conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace.”). Treanor, supra 
note 11, at 700 (“The founding generation believed that, if the President could commit the nation 
to war, his desire for fame might lead him into war even when war was not in the national interest.”); 
see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, supra note 87 and related text (describing how human nature may 
cause single person to seek personal gain, glory, and ambition through war). 
111. See, e.g., Obama NSS, supra note 108, at 13 (stressing importance of maritime security 
from the Arctic, to the Caribbean, to Southeast Asia and Horn of Africa). 
112. See, e.g., UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND, FACT SHEET: U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE 
IN EUROPE (1945–2016) (May 26, 2016), https://www.eucom.mil/doc/35220/u-s-forces-in-europe 
[https://perma.cc/77L3-NE9W] (showing roughly 62,000 United States active military personnel 
authorized in Europe); MARK E. MANYIN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, R41481, U.S.-
SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS 10–11 (2017) (discussing length of U.S. troop presence in South 
Korea). 
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at least some discretion to conduct the nation’s foreign affairs,113 a 
president enjoys substantial discretion—subject to funding constraints—
to employ the military in non-hostile ways that he or she deems 
geopolitically useful.114 Regular congressional funding, which now 
includes a large “slush fund” for “overseas contingency operations,”115 
provides presidents with ample monetary means to threaten, provoke, or 
initiate a use of military force without first consulting Congress.116 
Third, presidents and their legal advisors have arguably ignored or 
misinterpreted the text of the War Powers Resolution (WPR). After 
presidential excesses related to the conflict in Vietnam and its spillover 
to Cambodia, Congress attempted to reaffirm its authority over the 
nation’s use of military force by adopting the WPR over President 
Nixon’s veto.117 It requires congressional notification and subsequent 
approval of certain military deployments likely to result in the use of non-
defensive military force.118 
Executive branch legal advisors argue that the WPR authorizes a 
president to use the military in any way he or she desires for some period 
of time,119 or that the WPR is an unconstitutional intrusion upon 
presidential powers.120 These arguments effectively nullify a codified 
section of the WPR, which declares:  
[t]he constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to 
introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations 
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, 
(2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created 
 
113. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 75, at 95–98 (describing where the Constitution grants the 
power to determine foreign relations, which includes authority granted to the president). 
114. Id. at 119–22. 
115. See generally BRENDAN W. MCGARRY & EMILY M. MORGENSTERN, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R44519, OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS FUNDING: BACKGROUND AND STATUS 9 
(2019). 
116. For an analysis of the constitutional power to threaten or provoke war, see Matthew C. 
Waxman, The Constitutional Power to Threaten War, 123 YALE L.J. 1626, 1635 (2014). 
117. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (November 7, 1973) (codified 
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1549 (2019)). 
118. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1543–1544 (2019). 
119. See Syrian Airstrikes Memorandum, supra note 5, at 7 (arguing the War Powers Resolution 
implicitly approves unilateral presidential uses of military force and, in a footnote, arguing that its 
constraints do not limit the president). 
120. See, e.g., Overview of the War Powers Resolution, 8 Op. O.L.C. 271, 274–75 (Theodore 
B. Olson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of Legal Counsel 1984) (“The Executive Branch has taken the 
position from the very beginning that § 2(c) of the WPR does not constitute a legally binding 
definition of Presidential authority to deploy our armed forces.”). 
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by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its 
armed forces.121  
In other words, Congress attempted to reestablish, and the executive 
branch has effectively ignored, what the Framers of the Constitution 
clearly understood: that a president may use military force only pursuant 
to congressional authorization or an imperative necessity to defend the 
nation, its possessions, or its instrumentalities.122 
Fourth, despite the WPR, Congress has failed to formally and 
consistently condemn presidents for unconstitutional uses of military 
force.123 One cannot help but wonder if this apathy is in part the product 
of its members’ excessive partisanship or political cowardice—a desire 
to avoid accountability at the ballot box for formally taking a position 
with respect to a specific military endeavor.  
For example, when the Obama administration sought specific 
congressional authorization to fight the Islamic State, a Republican-
controlled Congress demurred.124 When the Obama administration 
sought congressional authorization to strike Syria for its alleged use of 
chemical weapons, Congress failed to give it, and several Republican 
members expressed skepticism of its utility.125 When the Trump 
administration conducted missile strikes against Syria without seeking 
congressional preapproval, some of those same Republican members of 
Congress expressed approval or tentative approval.126 Perhaps these 
inconsistent responses were influenced by the 2008 Democratic 
presidential primaries—in which a central focus was a candidate’s vote 
 
121. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c); Overview of the War Powers Resolution, supra note 120, at 274 
(claiming that, although enacted, the Senate and House dispute over this section, now codified at 
50 U.S.C. § 1541(c), was resolved by agreeing that it represents only policy, not law, and that it 
therefore has no legal affect). 
122. The defense of US citizens abroad is a more difficult constitutional question that I intend 
to address in future work. 
123. See infra Part IV (discussing the argument that authority is granted by Congressional 
failure to condemn unconstitutional uses of military force). 
124. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, A Congress That Doesn’t Want to Weigh In on War, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/us/politics/a-congress-that-doesnt-
want-to-weigh-in-on-war.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/HJC9-LBS2] (quoting members 
of Congress unwilling to approve a new authorization to use military force against the Islamic 
State). 
125. Peter Baker & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Seeks Approval for Strike in Syria, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/middleeast/syria.html 
[https://perma.cc/DP7B-6SFM]. 
126. Nicholas Fandos, Divided on Strikes, Democrats and Republican Press for Clearer Syria 
Strategy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/14/us/politics/congress-
syria-trump.html [https://perma.cc/AA6Y-6U6E]. 
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or firmly expressed opinion with respect to the questionable 2003 Iraq 
invasion.127 
Fifth, the courts largely avoid adjudicating cases that implicate the use 
of military force, particularly its initiation. There are notable but limited 
examples of judicial review with respect to the adoption of specific 
measures within an existing conflict, including Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, and Boumediene v. Bush.128 However, federal 
courts most often dismiss cases that involve a president’s unilateral use 
of military force,129 including those brought under the WPR.130 The 
upshot of this liberal judicial application of political question, official 
immunity, and other judicial avoidance doctrines is to leave essential 
legal questions about the war powers unanswered or ambiguous.131 As 
noted earlier, however, the federal courts traditionally adjudicated cases 
involving the executive’s use of military force to abrogate individual 
rights, including its authority to resort to the non-defensive use of war 
powers.132 
A final factor seems to be that “we the people” no longer demand 
accountability for most decisions to use military force. One might be 
 
127. See, e.g., Robert P. Saldin, Foreign Affairs and the 2008 Election, 6 FORUM 1, 8–9 (2008) 
(discussing benefits of Obama’s “unique position” opposing the Iraq war). 
128. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
129. See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 751, 774 (2003), aff’d, 
378 F.3d 1346, 1361–70 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1139 (2005) (dismissing the claim 
and stating that “the Court may not look behind the President’s discharge of his Constitutional 
duties as Commander in Chief”); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 402 F. Supp. 2d 267, 
276 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d, 559 F.3d 578 (D.C. Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, 330 F. App’x 200 
(D.C. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (dismissing the claim as involving 
sovereign immunity and presents a nonjusticiable political question). 
130. See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 902–03 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 720 F.2d 
1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (dismissing a claim that the president’s decision to supply military aid 
violated the WPR as a nonjusticiable political question); Sanchez Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 
596, 602 (D.D.C. 1983), affd, 770 F. 2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dismissing allegations that the 
president’s foreign assistance in Nicaragua violated the WPR as the allegations presented a 
nonjusticiable political question). 
131. See, e.g., Steven I. Vladeck, The New National Security Canon, 61 AM. U.L. REV. 1295, 
1329 (2012) (suggesting that at the Circuit level, more is going on than “faithful application of 
existing precedent,” leaving room for ambiguity in resolution). 
132. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 647 (1862) (describing the two scenarios: power 
to repel insurrections and invasions, which was given to the president by Congress, and the power 
to declare war, which is limited to Congress alone). Note that there were two grounds for the 
majority decision upholding Lincoln’s resort to non-defensive war measures after the attack on Fort 
Sumter. The first was that statutes authorized the president to determine how to respond to a 
rebellion and therefore implicitly authorized him to determine that a war existed. Id. at 668. The 
other was that Congress had ratified his actions. Id. at 670–71. The dissent would have required 
Congress to formally recognize the existence of a civil war before non-defensive force was 
permitted. Id. at 690–95. 
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tempted to claim that this indifference stems from a democracy deficit 
that resulted from ending the draft. Because less than one percent of the 
American public now serves in the military,133 a majority of Americans 
may no longer be attuned to or sufficiently interested in military forays 
abroad. This problem may also stem from or be exacerbated by a 
significant lack of constitutional and civic literacy.134 Whatever the 
reason(s), the apparent lack of general public interest or concern about 
the Constitution’s allocation of war powers likely relates to the nature of 
the threats present in the world today and the perceived need for a large, 
powerful, responsive and agile military to confront them.135 
The upshot of these and other factors is an executive branch 
emboldened to initiate non-defensive military force without consulting 
Congress, without sufficient consideration for long-term American 
interests, and without clear domestic legal authority to abrogate the rights 
of other nations, of foreign nationals, or of United States citizens. If we 
learn anything from President’s Trump border emergency declaration,136 
or from his more recent decision to target and kill an Iranian general that 
might have escalated to a wider war,137 it should be that making it too 
easy for a president to unilaterally declare or create an emergency, and 
too difficult for Congress to control or reverse those decisions, upsets the 
constitutional equilibrium, ignores the will of the people, and undermines 
the rule of law.138 This situation is unlikely to change unless the people 
 
133. GEORGE M. REYNOLDS & AMANDA SHENDRUK, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE U.S. MILITARY 1–2 (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/article/ 
demographics-us-military [https://perma.cc/M2DG-X6VA] (placing number at approximately 0.5 
percent of the US population). 
134. See Sheila Kennedy, Civic Ignorance and Democratic Accountability, 51 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
419 (2019). 
135. As Alexander Hamilton observed,  
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the 
ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction 
of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of 
continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose 
and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political 
rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.  
THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, supra note 41, at 41 (vol. 2, J. and A. McLean 1788). Although Hamilton 
was here speaking of the risk of standing armies that would be created by a failure of the colonies 
to unite in a new constitutional confederacy, his observation has proven salient in both the national 
and international context at least since the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
136. Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States, 
Fed. Reg. 34, 4949, 4949–50 (Feb. 20, 2019). 
137. See generally President Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump on the Killing of 
Qasem Soleimani (Jan. 3, 2020) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-killing-qasem-soleimani/ [https://perma.cc/2P83-YUK7]). 
138. When granting a partial preliminary injunction against the Trump Administration’s attempt 
to use emergency authorities to divert federal funds to construction of a border barrier otherwise 
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and their elected representatives demand respect for the original 
constitutional design and understanding. 
IV.  WHY ABERRANT PRACTICE CANNOT ESTABLISH NEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
In light of these developments, some commentators appear to have 
assimilated their contemporary views of the Constitution to current 
realities. One commentator, echoing the claims of many constitutional 
scholars, has proposed that constitutional concerns surrounding the use 
of military force should focus on whether Congress and the presidency 
engage in proper “war politics” and doubts the relevance of “juristic 
norms.”139 Another suggests that the Constitution has effectively been 
amended by practice to permit presidents to use at least some non-
defensive force unilaterally.140 Some add to these views the idea that we 
must construe independent presidential power to use non-defensive force 
more broadly in light of modern geopolitical complexities.141 Still 
another commentator suggests that Congress’s power to declare war is a 
very narrow and limited power to formally declare war, and that 
 
lacking congressional authorization in Sierra Club v. Trump, 379 F. Supp. 3d 883, 927 (N.D. Cal. 
2019), motion to stay denied, 2019 WL 2305341, at *2 (N.D. Cal 2019), the court observed 
Congress’s “absolute” control over federal expenditures—even when that control may 
frustrate the desires of the Executive Branch regarding initiatives it views as important—
is not a bug in our constitutional system. It is a feature of that system, and an essential 
one. The Appropriations Clause is “a bulwark of the Constitution’s separation of powers 
among the three branches of the National Government, and is particularly important as 
a restraint on Executive Branch officers.” 
Id. at 54 (citations omitted). See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Presidential claim[s] to a[n emergency] power at once so 
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium 
established by our constitutional system.”). 
139. ZEISBERG, supra note 13, at 21–24. See also POWELL, supra note 75, at 126 (“[T]here is 
no way to disentangle the constitutional from the policy and the political in questions about the 
formulation and implementation of United States foreign affairs.”); Monaghan, supra note 107, at 
32 (“To my mind, therefore, any attempt to circumscribe on constitutional grounds the president’s 
power to use armed force abroad confuses political with constitutional issues.”). 
140. See, e.g., GRIFFIN, supra note 24, at 48 (discussing how practice can be decisive from a 
legal point of view). 
141. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 107, at 27 (“Whatever the intention of the framers, the 
military machine has become simply an instrument for the achievement of foreign policy goals, 
which, in turn, have become a central responsibility of the presidency. . . . [T]he only limitation 
upon presidential power has been that imposed by political considerations. That is the teaching of 
our history.”); id. at 28 (“A line between aggressive and defensive action might have been workable 
in the era of Jefferson and Madison . . . . But that distinction can have little meaning for the 
president of a great global power in a highly complex and interdependent world.”). 
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Congress’s sole means to limit a president’s misuse of the armed forces 
is to deny funding for military measures to which it objects.142 
All of these approaches significantly discount the importance of —or 
grossly misinterpret—the Constitution’s original design and meaning. 
The first embraces alleged ambiguity that has largely been manufactured 
by aberrant executive branch practice over time. The last appears to be a 
misreading of history and precedent.143 The others expressly claim or 
implicitly suggest that the elected branches of government may alter the 
original constitutional design and meaning by later practice. This Essay’s 
earlier analysis addressed the arguments underpinning the claims based 
in the Constitution’s text. This Part will therefore address whether 
subsequent practice can alter a well-established, original constitutional 
meaning regarding the Constitution’s functional allocation of the power 
to use military force. 
Historical practice is often considered when addressing ambiguities in 
the text or original meaning of the Constitution, particularly in situations 
involving the separation of powers.144 Sometimes referred to as 
 
142. Yoo, supra note 28, at 193–94. Other commentators more or less agree with this view. See 
Treanor, supra note 11, at 696–97 (listing pro-Executive commentators). 
143. Professor Yoo’s misreading of history and precedent has been refuted in significant 
measure by other commentators. See, e.g., GRIFFIN, supra note 24, at 41–45 (stating that Yoo’s 
project is contrary to advice regarding war powers, ignores the change in American thinking 
through pre- to post-Revolutionary period, and Yoo does not cite direct evidence to support his 
position); RAMSEY, supra note 11, at 448 n.42–43 (stating that Yoo’s argument as it pertains to the 
clause preventing the president’s unilateral initiation of war is unfounded in text or historical 
practice); Prakash, supra note 11, at 58 (outlining that Yoo’s assertion is incorrect because if the 
Constitution wanted to give the president war-making powers, it would have). A full account of the 
inaccuracies in Yoo’s scholarship would require extensive commentary. To provide one example, 
Professor Yoo’s analysis of some of the Supreme Court precedent discussed earlier, Bas. v. Tingy, 
4 U.S. 37 (1800), Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1801), Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804), and 
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804), supra Section II.A, and related text, is 
superficial and misleading. Professor Yoo first deceptively claims that “none of these cases called 
upon the Supreme Court to decide that the president was waging war in violation of the 
Constitution, or that Congress had failed to declare that a state of war existed, or that courts could 
step in to adjudicate inter-branch disputes over war.” Yoo, supra note 28, at 293. Although these 
statements are true as far as they go, they elide the fact that each of these cases did require the Court 
to determine the ability of executive branch officers to claim authority to use certain war powers 
against certain targets, as well as the relative authority of Congress and the president to authorize 
and limit the use of those powers. After a cursory and seemingly result-oriented analysis, Yoo 
concludes that “[n]either Bas, Talbot, nor Little (nor all three added together) constituted the 
Marbury [v. Madison] of foreign relations law.” Id. at 294. While not the Marbury of “foreign 
relations law,” the cases do engage in Marbury-style judicial review of war measures and therefore 
strongly support the idea that the courts have a role in policing rights invasions when they have 
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties. For a collection and analysis of similar precedent, 
see Dehn, Choice of Law, supra note 106, at 2134–40 (referencing the Charming Betsy case, the 
Little case, and The Prize Cases, among many others). 
144. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014) (justifying resort to “the practice of the 
government” particularly in separation of powers cases). For analysis of this approach in the context 
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“historical gloss,” the basic notion is that gaps or ambiguities in the 
Constitution’s text or meaning can be clarified by the practice of the 
government.145 The idea that the elected branches of government can 
alter the Constitution’s separation of powers by later practice rather than 
formal amendment or constitutionally compliant legislation, however, is 
suspect. This is particularly the case, it would seem, when doing so 
substantially alters the functional constitutional basis for invading 
fundamental individual rights. 
The first problem with the notion that the Constitution’s separation of 
powers can be altered rather than merely clarified by historical practice 
is that it is, at bottom, a claim that the elected branches of government 
can do informally what the text of the Constitution indicates they cannot 
do formally without the consent of the people through their state 
representatives.146 In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall stated 
the truism that no branch of government may act in violation of the 
Constitution, whether by formal legislation or other official act.147 As 
Marshall noted, the Constitution declares that only laws made “in 
pursuance” of its terms are supreme law of the land.148 Furthermore, the 
idea that all government officials must act consistently with the 
Constitution arises naturally from the fact of a written constitution and its 
requirement that each member of government swear an oath of loyalty to 
it.149 To paraphrase Marshall’s rhetorical question, why should all 
members of the federal and state governments swear an oath to the 
Constitution of the United States if it forms no rule for their official 
acts?150 
 
of the separation of powers, see Curtis A. Bradley & Niel S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional 
Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 261–62 (2017) (stating 
that while the historical gloss approach is frequently used, the approach is not fully defined); Curtis 
A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 411, 414–15 (2012) (emphasizing four overarching points in the analysis of historical gloss 
and the separation of powers). 
145. Bradley & Siegel, supra note 144, at 257; Bradley & Morrison, supra note 144, at 413–
14. 
146. See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring concurrence of three fourths of state legislatures or state 
conventions to amend the Constitution). 
147. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803) (“[T]he particular phraseology of the 
Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential 
to all written Constitutions, that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well 
as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”). 
148. Id. at 180. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (stating the Constitution, laws of the United States, 
and treaties, shall be the supreme “Law of the Land”). 
149. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176–80. 
150. Id. at 180. Marshall refers to the judiciary and Congress in this section of the opinion, but 
his logic is equally applicable to any member of either federal and state governments, all of whom 
are constitutionally required to take a similar oath. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (prescribing 
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Marshall addressed the idea that subsequent practice may clarify 
constitutional meaning in McCulloch v. Maryland: 
[A] doubtful [constitutional] question, one on which human reason may 
pause, and the human judgment be suspended, in the decision of which 
the great principles of liberty are not concerned, but the respective 
powers of those who are equally the representatives of the people, are 
to be adjusted; if not put at rest by the practice of the government, ought 
to receive a considerable impression from that practice. An exposition 
of the constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts . . .  ought 
not to be lightly disregarded.151 
Marshall thus provided three requirements necessary to giving 
interpretive weight to government practice. First, the Constitution’s 
meaning must be ambiguous. Second, the ambiguity and any related 
subsequent government practice cannot pertain to “great principles of 
liberty.” And third, the relevant practice of the elected branches must be 
“deliberately established,” which in McCulloch involved statutes to 
which both the executive and legislative branches assented.152 
Similarly, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice 
Frankfurter posited that “[d]eeply embedded traditional ways of 
conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, 
but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply them.”153 He 
therefore posited: 
[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by 
Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as 
it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, 
may be treated as a gloss on executive [p]ower vested in the 
President . . . .154 
 
the president’s oath); id. art. VI, § 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the 
members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United 
States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation to support this 
Constitution.”). 
151. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819). 
152. Id. 
153. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J. 
concurring) (emphasis added). 
154. Id. at 610–11. This is not a claim that original meaning must always control constitutional 
interpretation. It is a narrower claim that the functional allocation powers in the respective branches 
of government cannot be altered without a valid congressional delegation or formal amendment. 
Some might be tempted to assert that the Court’s abandonment of a strict non-delegation doctrine 
with respect to legislative powers proves the opposite. However, some scholarly commentary 
persuasively argues that the non-delegation doctrine was more myth than fact. See Eric A. Posner 
& Adrian Vermule, Interring the Non-Delegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1722–23 
(2002) (“[T]here just is no constitutional nondelegation rule, nor has there ever been. The 
nondelegation position lacks any foundation in constitutional text and structure, in standard 
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Frankfurter’s requirement for a consistent, unchallenged and unbroken 
practice is similar to Marshall’s view that a practice must be “deliberately 
established,” requiring actual or readily apparent assent to a government 
practice by both elected branches of government. A majority of the 
Supreme Court effectively embraced this approach in Dames & Moore v. 
Regan.155 
Applying these tenets to the constitutional power to use military force 
undermines any argument that historical gloss has amended the 
Constitution. Both Marshall and Frankfurter advanced the entirely logical 
proposition that practice cannot violate or supplant the Constitution, and 
neither limits this claim to its text. In other words, neither the text nor a 
broadly held, firmly established original constitutional meaning or 
understanding regarding the separation of powers may be altered by 
subsequent practice on later claims of ambiguity or by aberrant 
government practice.156 A proper reading of the Constitution’s text and 
adoption history, as well as a review of early practice and judicial 
precedent clearly establishes that there is no substantial ambiguity 
regarding the Constitution’s original allocation of the power to initiate 
non-defensive military force to Congress alone.157 True ambiguity 
surrounds only the scope of a president’s authority to use defensive force 
when another nation has begun or declared war against the United 
 
originalist sources, or in sound economic and political theory. Nondelegation is nothing more than 
a controversial theory that floated around the margins of nineteenth-century constitutionalism—a 
theory that wasn’t clearly adopted by the Supreme Court until 1892, and even then only in dictum. 
The Court’s invocation of the rule to invalidate two statutes in 1935 was nothing more than a local 
aberration, no more to be taken as constitutionally fundamental than, say, the original package 
doctrine, the doctrine of irrebuttable presumptions, or any of a myriad other constitutional 
eccentricities that few now bother remembering.”). 
155. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981). See also United States v. Midwest 
Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 473 (1915) (giving interpretive weight to historical practice). 
156. Recent commentary suggests that giving a prominent if not primary role to originalist 
constructions of the Constitution’s text is preferable. See Curtis A. Bradley & Nigel S. Siegel, 
Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1230 (2015) (stating that 
the text in constitutional practice is not able to be changed by common law methods but has to be 
changed through a formal amendment). Bradley and Siegal posit that “the authoritative meaning of 
the constitutional text [is] determined by a process of constructed constraint” and that “the theory 
of constructed constraint suggests . . . that originalists have conceded too little ground, not too 
much.” Id. at 1270. 
157. Prakash, supra note 11, at 93–94 (“If one looks to the Framers, it is clear that they regarded 
the power to “declare war” as encompassing the power to start a war. The same is true of the 
Ratifiers—they too believed the Constitution granted Congress the power to start a war. If we look 
for the original public meaning, public usage in Europe and America confirms that to enter into a 
war was to declare it. Finally, if we look to those who implemented the Constitution in its early 
years, we see a consensus that only Congress could take the nation from peace into war. While a 
constitution surely could incorporate the narrow, formal definition of “declare war,” there is no 
evidence that the federal Constitution did or that anyone regarded it as so doing.”). 
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States.158 Assertions that contemporary ambiguity resulting from 
unilateral presidential practice and instances of congressional 
acquiescence reduces the issue to merely a political question or amends 
the Constitution are highly problematic.159 
Marshall also asserted that any constitution-clarifying government 
practice may not pertain to a matter involving “the great principles of 
liberty.” Presumably, Marshall here speaks of the fundamental principles 
protecting life, liberty, and property as highlighted in the Declaration of 
Independence, among other places.160 The gist of Marshall’s concern 
appears to be that the practice of the elected branches should not be 
determinative when it amounts to altering the government’s power to 
affect fundamental individual rights. 
Marshall’s concern logically applies to any government practice that 
substantially alters the functional constitutional basis or authority for 
abrogating such individual rights. Preserving the Constitution’s 
separation of powers is an important aspect of protecting these basic 
liberty interests. As Justice Scalia explained in his NLRB v. Noel Canning 
concurrence, the Constitution’s “core, government-structuring provisions 
are no less critical to preserving liberty than are the later adopted 
provisions of the Bill of Rights.”161 He noted, these “structural provisions 
reflect the founding generation’s deep conviction that ‘checks and 
balances provisions were the foundation of a structure of government that 
would protect liberty.’”162 He continued “[i]t is for that reason that ‘the 
claims of individuals—not of Government departments—have been the 
principal source of judicial decisions concerning separation of powers 
and checks and balances.’”163 
 
158. Compare id. at 94–112 (concluding the president is limited to strictly defensive measures 
even if another nation has declared war on the United States) with Michael D. Ramsey, The 
President’s Power to Respond to Attacks, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 169, 177 (2007) (arguing “historical 
evidence supports president’s ability to use offensive military measures if another country initiates 
war”). See also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1862) (“If a war be made by invasion of a 
foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not 
initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative 
authority.”). 
159. But see NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014) (“These precedents show that 
this Court has treated practice as an important interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity 
of that practice is subject to dispute . . . .”). 
160. For an excellent analysis of the modern importance of the Declaration of Independence in 
constitutional interpretation, see Alexander Tsesis, The Declaration of Independence and 
Constitutional Interpretation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 369 (2016). 
161. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 570 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
162. Id. at 571 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986)). 
163. Id. (quoting Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011)). 
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Although many commentators sympathetic to the “political question” 
view of war powers consider it to be primarily or exclusively a foreign 
affairs power,164 there is no question that this power also implicates 
fundamental liberty interests. As noted earlier, the cases in which the 
courts have engaged in judicial review of war measures conclusively 
establish that this power entails legal authority to invade rights to life, 
liberty, or property, including those of Americans.165 This entails, among 
other things, the ability to deprive American citizens of these rights by 
confiscating their property,166 or forcing them to serve in the active armed 
forces—for example via a draft or a reserve component activation167—to 
support a given military conflict. It also includes the power to impose 
domestic emergency measures incident to any resulting conflict,168 as 
well as the power to generate fiscal requirements to support a protracted 
military engagement that Congress and, ultimately the people, will be 
required to fund. 
Even more significantly, the power to initiate non-defensive military 
force includes the power to capture and detain or to kill foreign nationals 
and even American citizens who are properly determined to be part of an 
“enemy” armed force.169 The Supreme Court has also upheld the capture 
 
164. See, e.g., POWELL, supra note 75, at 130–31 (stating that controversies regarding exercises 
of foreign policy are usually political questions which are not within the purview of the judiciary 
to resolve); ZEISBERG, supra note 13, at 21 (stating hostilities within the Constitution are a political 
question regarding the security power); Monaghan, supra note 107, at 23 (stating reliance on the 
political question doctrine is appropriate in foreign affairs). 
165. See supra Section II.C (detailing the judicial precedent Congress possesses over non-
defensive uses of military force). 
166. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 174–75 (1804) (implicitly finding ships and vessels 
may be seized when they carry goods that may defeat the U.S.’s measures); The Prize Cases, 67 
U.S. 635, 655 (1862) (stating a citizen’s property may be liable to capture and confiscation); 
Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115, 133 (1851) (stating as a general rule, it is not legal to trade with 
a public enemy and if caught, the goods are liable to seizure and confiscation). 
167. Regarding the draft, see Selective Service Extension Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-599, 
64 Stat. 318 (codified June 30, 1950) (empowering the president to order the Reserves into the 
active military with or without their consent for no more than a twenty-one consecutive month 
period). Regarding reserve component activation, see U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 16 (stating that 
Congress has the power to reserve the “[a]ppointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training 
the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress[.]”). 
168. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (providing for suspension of writ of habeas corpus). 
169. For concise analysis of constitutional issues arising in a case involving the targeting of 
“enemy” American citizens, including a review of relevant Supreme Court precedent, see generally 
John C. Dehn & Kevon Jon Heller, Debate, Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar Al-Alaqui, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 175 (2011); John C. Dehn, Targeting Citizens in Armed Conflict: Examining the 
Threat to the Rule of Law . . . in Context, CATO UNBOUND: J. DEBATE (June 8, 2011), 
https://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/06/08/john-c-dehn/targeting-citizens-armed-conflict-
examining-threat-rule-law-context [https://perma.cc/9QMP-QPCR] (arguing judicial precedent 
clearly holds or implies that the president has constitutional authority to kill or capture and detain 
U.S. citizens properly deemed enemies at war with the United States). 
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or destruction of the property of American citizens when properly 
deemed enemy property.170 Allowing a president unilateral authority to 
use non-defensive military force removes Congress from a constitutional 
decision-making process that is meant to limit courses of action that 
threaten to and often do deprive individuals, including American citizens, 
of basic rights in these ways. 
Modern limitations on judicial remedies for injuries arising from 
military operations do not alter the conclusion that the decision to use 
military force implicates great principles of liberty. Both Congress and 
the courts have made it more difficult to obtain judicial remedies for 
individual rights invasions by government officials,171 particularly in 
relation to military operations and other matters arising outside the United 
States.172 These contemporary restrictions on judicial remedies may alter 
the perception of whether great liberty principles are implicated by the 
use of non-defensive military force. They do not, however, change the 
fact the power to use military force includes the power to deprive 
American citizens and foreign nationals of their fundamental rights. Why 
would the Framers have devoted so much attention to congressional 
control of the military establishment and the use of military force if not 
to protect the people from abuses of those institutions and powers?173 
The last factor relevant to whether historical practice provides 
competent evidence of constitutional meaning is that there must be 
relatively clear and, when necessary, consistent agreement about a given 
practice between the executive and legislative branches. Under 
 
170. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 671–75 (upholding capture and condemnation of property of 
citizens of states in rebellion against authority of the United States); Miller v. U.S., 78 U.S. 268, 
304–08 (1870) (similar); Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297, 307–11 (1909) (refusing 
compensation for destruction of American citizen deemed enemy property in enemy territory). 
171. See generally Vladeck, supra note 131; see also El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United 
States, 55 Fed. Cl. 751, 764 (2003), aff’d, 378 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 
1139 (2005) (resolving that “[t]he Constitutional protection afforded by the Takings Clause is not 
intended to compensate for destruction of enemy war-making property through the exercise of 
military force.”); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 402 F. Supp. 2d 267, 276 (D.D.C. 
2005), aff’d, 559 F.3d 578 (D.C. Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, 330 F. App’x 200 (D.C. Cir. 
2009), aff’d, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (stating the political question doctrine 
prevents courts from reviewing claims of political branches’ decisions regarding foreign policy or 
national security). 
172. For example, the Federal Tort Claims Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. §1346(b), §1402(b), 
§2401(b), and §§ 2671–2680, converts claims against federal employees acting within the scope of 
their office or employment into claims against the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d). Jurisdiction 
is then barred for claims “arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or 
the Coast Guard, during time of war,” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j), and claims “arising in a foreign 
country,” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k). 
173. For a discussion of the dangers attending standing armies and the continual danger of war, 
see THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, supra note 41. 
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Marshall’s reasoning in McCulloch, this can take the form of enacted 
legislation, although legislation is not always dispositive if found to 
violate clear constitutional requirements or constraints.174 According to 
Frankfurter, it can also arise from a long, unbroken executive practice 
known to and accepted by Congress. Neither is present in this area of 
constitutional law. 
The WPR alone is strong evidence that Congress does not accept or 
agree with modern presidential assertions of unilateral power to use non-
defensive military force.175 Commentators have documented other, 
more-recent situations in which Congress did not entirely acquiesce in 
assertions of presidential power in this area,176 despite noting institutional 
factors that limit Congress’s ability to do so.177 Although a thorough 
review of recent congressional reactions is beyond the scope of this 
Essay, the evidence is clear enough that not all claims of a unilateral 
presidential power to use non-defensive military force have gone 
unchallenged by Congress. To claim that modern presidential practice 
coupled with, at best, inconsistent congressional responses somehow 
alters or clarifies the Constitution is to give a dangerous and—in light of 
the Constitution’s original allocation of war- and military-related powers 
to Congress—entirely unwarranted institutional preference to the 
historical practice of the presidency.178 
V.  REESTABLISHING ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS OVER NON-
DEFENSIVE MILITARY FORCE 
Because the Constitution allocates superior authority over the military 
establishment and its use to Congress, and because historical practice 
cannot alter this original meaning, it is imperative that Congress 
aggressively reassert its powers. Specifically, this requires that Congress 
more closely control funding for military operations as well as more 
consistently and formally condemn unconstitutional uses of force. This 
 
174. The clearest example here is I.N.S. v. Chadha, in which the Court held unconstitutional a 
one-house, legislative “veto” of executive branch discretionary decisions made pursuant to a 
statute. 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). The Court noted that the congressional veto was legislative in 
nature in part because it was “action that had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, 
duties and relations of persons.” Id. at 952. 
175. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 144, at 467 (“[A]ny claim of congressional 
acquiescence in this area needs to take account of the War Powers Resolution—and not just the 
sections that some commentators construe as accepting a certain measure of unilateral presidential 
authority.”). 
176. Id. at 461–68. 
177. Id. at 440–44. 
178. See also id. at 468 (“[C]ongress’s influence on presidential war powers should not be 
judged simply by the rare times when it enacts legislation restricting presidential action.”). 
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Part briefly explains why this congressional response is necessary and 
suggests how Congress might respond to constitutionally aberrant 
presidential uses of force in the future. 
First, it is important to recall that the oath taken by every member of 
Congress requires them to support the Constitution.179 As Marshall 
stated, this means that these elected officials are legally and morally 
obligated to abide by the Constitution, and therefore to maintain the 
Constitution’s separation of powers. Given its effect on fundamental 
rights, this is especially true of the power to initiate the use of non-
defensive military force. 
As earlier discussed, however, Congress has exercised some of its 
powers in ways that effectively cede much of its ability to check 
executive power by limiting the size and nature of the military 
establishment. If Congress accepts that the contemporary geopolitical 
environment requires a large, complex, heavily-equipped, and highly-
trained military with significant discretionary funding to defend and 
advance American interests, then its powers to control the existence, size, 
and composition of the armed forces is no longer a significant tool with 
which to check presidential abuses of power. For similar reasons, 
exercising its constitutional power to place restrictions on access to the 
modern militia in response to external threats is also likely to be viewed 
as unwise policy. Given the centrality of these congressional powers to 
the Framers’ approach to preventing presidential abuses of the war 
powers and tyranny, their effective nullification in response to the current 
strategic environment is a significant loss.180 
In light of these realities, Congress must more tightly control the 
availability and expenditure of funds for military operations. One 
approach is for Congress to prohibit the expenditure or commitment of 
funds for the purpose of supporting or conducting any military 
deployments, attacks or other activities that are inconsistent with the 
WPR, particularly the section clarifying the limits of the president’s 
constitutional authority to use military force.181 If Congress wants to 
 
179. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3. 
180. Interestingly, in response to an apparent concern that the two-year limitation on funding 
was inadequate insurance against tyranny that might imposed by a large standing army, Hamilton 
wrote, 
[I]f the defense of the community . . . should make it necessary to have an army so 
numerous as to hazard its liberty, this is one of those calamaties [sic] for which there is 
neither preventative nor cure. It cannot be provided against by any possible form of 
government . . . . 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, supra note 72, at 167–68 (vol. 2, J. and A. McLean 1788). 
181. See 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (stating the president may use military force in a declaration of 
war, with specific statutory authorization, or in a national emergency created by attack on the U.S., 
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grant the executive branch broader discretion to use force for a given 
geopolitical situation, it can specifically provide for that discretion, either 
by authorizing the stationing of troops there, which may defend 
themselves if attacked, or in some other aspect of its annual authorizing 
and funding legislation. This would give Congress a greater role in 
identifying the nation’s key strategic interests that merit a rapid military 
response. 
There are certainly drawbacks to this proposal. One is that the 
executive branch has claimed constitutional authority to violate similar 
fiscal limitations in the past.182 Another is that giving Congress a role in 
defining geopolitical interests that justify a rapid military response 
reduces strategic agility. Unforeseen events can rapidly alter the 
geopolitical environment. Regular coordination and review of strategic 
priorities between the executive and legislative branches would likely be 
time-consuming and difficult, but are essential to this proposal. Finally, 
there is a risk that partisan politics coupled with the volume of 
information needed to determine and establish these priorities might 
render Congress either a rubber stamp for executive branch preferences 
or an insurmountable obstacle to updating strategic priorities. Congress 
would need to prioritize its institutional responsibilities to the nation over 
its partisan attitudes toward a sitting president.183 
Congress must also more aggressively defend its sole constitutional 
authority to authorize non-defensive military force. The executive branch 
typically cites instances of congressional intransigence or acquiescence 
to unilateral presidential uses of non-defensive force to support its claims 
of presidential power to engage in them.184 Congress must more 
consistently and forcefully counter these claims through formal action 
 
the U.S. territories, its possessions, or its armed forces). 
182. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-326013, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—
COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT 5 (2014) (in response to GAO 
inquiry, the Department of Defense asserted that a funding limitation on the transfer of Taliban 
prisoners unconstitutionally intruded on the president’s powers). For an analysis of this report and 
related matters, see Celidon Pitt, Fair Trade: The President’s Power to Recover Captured U.S. 
Servicemembers and the Recent Prisoner Exchange with the Taliban, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2837, 
2840–41 (2015) (arguing the exchange was illegal) and id. at 2876–85 (stating the president 
violated spending restriction and appropriations riders). 
183. For discussion and analysis of one way in which partisan politics influences the political 
process related to wars, see generally Michael T. Heaney, The Partisan Politics of Antiwar 
Legislation in Congress, 2001–2010, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 129. 
184. See, e.g., Syrian Airstrikes Memorandum, supra note 5, at 5–7 (explaining that historically, 
the president has acted without Congress’ explicit authorization prior to taking military action); 
Military Force in Libya Memorandum, supra note 6, at 7–9 (stating that historical practice generally 
permits the president to initiate military force despite the absence of congressional approval and 
Congress has implicitly recognized the presidential authority to do so). 
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that identifies and condemns presidential overreach and reasserts its 
institutional prerogatives.185 
It also bears noting that neither the Constitution nor any laws made 
pursuant to it—including any laws prohibiting the use of federal funds 
for unauthorized military forays—are self-enforcing. Congress must 
exercise its other constitutional authorities whenever a president ignores 
such laws. These authorities primarily include the power to pass joint 
resolutions that articulate a “sense of Congress” disagreeing with 
presidential action,186 the power to censure a president,187 or, if 
ultimately necessary, the power to impeach a president.188 
CONCLUSION 
The constitutional authority to use our nation’s substantial military 
force to damage or destroy lives and property is not and should never be 
reduced to merely a political question. The use of military force always 
raises questions of law regarding the government’s authority to deprive 
individuals, including Americans, of their most fundamental individual 
rights. The text and structure of the Constitution, as well as The Federalist 
essays, show that the Framers saw these risks and principles clearly and 
designed our founding document accordingly. While a legal requirement 
for congressional preapproval of non-defensive force may be perceived 
as an inefficient mechanism for addressing the complex geopolitical 
environment that now exists, it is the binding legal framework established 
by our fundamental law. So long as it remains unamended, their oaths 
obligate both Congress and the presidency to reestablish and to respect 
these original constitutional norms when addressing the nation’s 
contemporary security needs. 
 
185. See, e.g., Joint Resolution Regarding United States Policy Toward Haiti, Pub. L. No. 103-
423, 108 Stat. 4358 (1994) (outlining the requirements the president and executive branch must 
follow when using non-defensive force). 
186. See, e.g., id. (expressing “sense of Congress” that “the President should have sought and 
welcomed Congressional approval before deploying United States Armed Forces to Haiti.”). 
187. On the constitutionality of a congressional censure, see Jack Chaney, The Constitutionality 
of Censuring the President, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 989 (2000) (arguing censure is unconstitutional 
Bill of Attainder); James C. Ho, Misunderstood Precedent: Andrew Jackson and the Real Case 
Against Censure, 24 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL. 283, 303–07 (2000) (similarly asserting that 
censure power is not founded in the historical record). 
188. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole power 
of impeachment); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6–7 (providing Senate power to try impeachment, prescribing 
procedure, and limiting penalties). Others have suggested “charter” legislation for the domestic 
national security system. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why a President Almost Always Wins in Foreign 
Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 95 YALE L.J. 1255, 1338–342 (1988) (asserting that 
charter legislation would restore balance to national security matters). 
